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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

~

78A.-.J .. l 02(3 )(j ).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1
Issue 1:

Whether the district court correctly held that Gables at Sterling

Village Homeowners Association ("HOA" or "Association") lacks contractual privity to
assert its breach of the implied warranty of habitability claim?

Standard of Review: An appeal of a summary judgment decision is considered
"under a de novo standard of review, granting no deference to the district court's
analysis." L.C. Canyon Partners, L.L.C. v. Salt lake Countv, 2011 UT 63,

fi 8. 266 P.3d

797. "A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference; we review
them for correctness." Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467,470 (Utah 1989).

Preservation: R. 1074-1401, 1682-1702, 4092-4097, 4169-4171, 10297-10303
(1/10/2014 Hearing Tr.).

Issue 2:

Whether the district court correctly held that the HOA failed to

establish a prima facie case of breach of the implied warranty?

Standard of Review: An appeal of a summary judgment decision is considered
"under a de novo standard of review, granting no deference to the district court's
analysis." L.C. Canvon Partners, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2011 UT 63,

i; 8, 266

P.3d

797. "A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no particular deference; we review
them for correctness." Grnvson Roper Ltd. v. Finlin:::;on, 782 P.2d 467. 470 (t:uh l \>Si.)).

1

Appellant's issues on appeal numbers three and four do not apply to this Appellee and
therefore are not addressed in this brief. (HOA Br. at 2, 21-22, 35-51.)
2

Preservation: R. 1074-1401, 1682-1702, 4092-4097, 4169-4171, 10297-10303

(1/10/2014 Hearing Tr.).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Gables at Sterling Village ("Gables") is a residential development located in
South Jordan, Utah. Gables consists of 78 residential units in 15 buildings, which are
surrounded by common areas. Gables was developed by Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs/Appellees Castlewood-Sterling Village I, LLC ("Castlewood-Sterling"); Jeffrey
A. Duke ("Duke"); Darren Mansell ("Mansell"); Dan Lybbert ("Lybbert"); Castlewood
Development, LLC, which converted into Castlewood Development, Inc. ("Castlewood
Development"); and Richard L. Harris ("Harris") (collectively, "Developers"). Gables
was constructed by Castlewood Builders, LLC ("Builders"), as general contractor.
Builders hired several sub-contractors to assist in the construction work at Gables.
On or about June 28, 2006, Developers established the HOA by recording the

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Gables at Sterling Village, A
Planned Unit Development ("Declaration"). The Developers transferred control of the
HOA to the Gables homeowners on January 1, 2008. The HOA claims it discovered
defects in the construction of certain buildings at Gables shortly thereafter. The HOA
hired an expert to investigate further and draft a report detailing the alleged defects.
On February 2, 2010, the HOA filed suit against the Developers and Builders
alleging, among other things, that the Developers and Builders breached the implied
warranty of habitability by defectively constructing the buildings at the Gables. The
Developers and Builders then sued various subcontractors, including R&JL, for breach of

3

contract alleging that if Developers and Builders were liable to the HOA under an
implied warranty claim then the subcontractors were liable to Developers and Builders
for those damages. At the close of fact discovery, one of the sub-contractors, B.A.
Critchfield Construction, LLC ("Critchfield"), filed a motion for summary judgment
against the HOA. In its motion for summary judgment, Critchfield argued that the HOA
lacked contractual privity to sue either the Builders or the Developers, and, even if the
HOA did have privity, the HOA failed to establish a prima facie case of breach of the
implied warranty. R&JL filed a joinder to Critchfield' s motion for summary judgment.
On March 4, 2014, the district court granted Critchfield' s motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the HOA' s breach of the implied warranty claim. 2 The district
court concluded that contractual privity is necessary for a breach of the implied warranty
claim and the HOA did not have contractual privity with the Developers or Builders. The
district court further held that the HOA failed to satisfy the elements for a breach of the
implied warranty claim as this Court detailed in Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing
Homeowners Association v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing. LC, 2009 UT 65, 221 P.3d
234 (hereinafter ''Davencourf'). The HOA now appeals the district court's ruling.

2

Third-Party Defendants Critchfield and Beus Roofing, Inc. also moved for summary
judgment against Third-Party Plaintiffs on their Third-Party Complaint. R&JL also joined
in those motions. The district court granted summary judgment and dismissed the thirdparty claims against the Third-Party Defendants. That order granting summary judgment
in favor of R&JL and the other Third-Party Defendants on the third-party claims has not
been appealed.
4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The HOA filed its Complaint with the district court on February 2, 2010. (R. 136.) On March 12, 2010, the HOA filed its First Amended Complaint. (R. 40-68.) In its
Third Cause of Action, the HOA alleges that the Developers and Builders breached the
implied warranties of construction in a workmanlike manner and habitability. (R. 54-57.)
The HOA' s claim arises from alleged defects in the construction of the buildings at
Gables. On March 18, 2011, Developers and Builders filed their Third-Party Complaint
and Jury Demand ("Third-Party Complaint"). (R. 147-159.) In the Third-Party
Complaint, Developers and Builders allege that "[i]n the event it is found that any of the
workmanship or materials provided by the [Developers and Builders] are defective," it is
because R&JL and the other subcontractors breached their contractual obligations to
Builders. (R. 153-154.)

A.

Development of the Gables.

Castlewood-Sterling owned and developed the real property at the Gables. (R.
2178 at ,I 2.) Castlewood Development is the manager of Castlewood-Sterling. (R. 2178
at

,r

3.) Builders operated as a separate and independent general contract entity and

constructed the improvement at Gables, including the building common areas and all lot
infrastructure improvements. (R. 2178 at 'll'TT 1, 5.) The Developers created the HOA by
recording the Declaration with the Salt Lake County Recorder on June 28, 2006. (R. 2182
at 'lf 23.) Pursuant to the Declaration, the HOA is responsible for the maintenance, repair,
and replacement of the exterior surfaces and roofs of the units at Gables. (R. 43 at
R. 2206.)

5
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B.

The HOA Observes Construction Defects.

After homeowners began moving into the units, they reported defects in the
construction, including concrete cracking and potential water intrusion. (R. 45 at

,r 23.)

The HOA retained experts to inspect the scope of the reported concrete cracking and
water intrusion. (R. 45 at

,r

24.) The HOA' s experts allegedly found cracking in the

stucco on the exterior of the buildings, cracking in concrete, and water intrusion into the
foundations, floors, porches, stucco, sidewalls, exterior walls, doors, windows, and roofs.
(R. 45 at

,r 25.)

The HOA alleges that it made repeated requests that Developers and

Builders repair the alleged defects, but Developers and Builders did not repair and correct
the alleged defects. (R. 47 at ,r 28.)

C.

The HOA Files Suit against the Developers and Builders.

The HOA initiated this lawsuit against the Developers and Builders alleging that
Developers and Builders breached the implied warranty to a new residence. (R. 2178 at ,r
6.) The HOA argues that the Declaration is a contract between Developers and the HOA
and the Declaration includes an implied warranty of construction in a workmanlike
manner and the warranty of habitability. (R. 2178 at

,r 7.) The HOA further

argues that

Developers breached the Declaration, and the implied warranties of workmanlike
construction and habitability, by failing to hire a general contractor that would adequately
inspect and supervise construction work in accordance with the project plans and that
would make sure subcontractors complied with accepted industry standards applicable to
their area of work. (R. 2179 at

,r

8.) The HOA admits that it does not have privity of

contract with Builders. (R. 2179 at iJ 9; R. 2181 at iJ 15.)

6

Developers

and

Builders

filed

the

Third-Party

Complaint

against

the

subcontractors on March 18, 2011. (R. 147-159.) Developers and Builders allege that the
named third-party defendants provided material or services for the construction of
Gables. (R. 149 at ,I 8; R. 2180-2181.) Developers and Builders allege that R&JL
performed work with regard to the Gables' soffit and fascia. (R. 151 at ~ 22.) Developers
and Builders claim they entered into a subcontract with R&JL and that R&JL breached
that contract. (R. 153 at ,I 33.) However, R&JL only entered into one contract related to
Gables, and that contract was executed by and between R&JL and Builders. (R. 16821702.) Developers did not enter into a contract with R&JL, and thus there is no privity of
contract between Developers and R&JL. (R. 1686-1702.)

D.

Critchfield Moves for Summary Judgment and R&JL Joins in
the Motion.

On September 6, 2013, Critchfield filed a motion for summary judgment seeking
dismissal of the HOA' s breach of implied warranty claim against Developers and
Builders. (R. 1074-1076.) Specifically, Critchfield claimed the HOA lacked standing to
bring its breach of implied warranty claim because the HOA is not, and never has been,
an owner of any of the units at Gables, and, therefore, lacks contractual privity with either
Developers or Builders. (R. 1083-1086.) Critchfield further argued that the HOA failed to
satisfy the necessary elements for a breach of the implied warranty claim. (R. 10871090.) In support of its arguments, Critchfield relied on this Court's decision m
Davencourt. (R. 1084-1090.) On September 20, 2013, R&JL filed its Joinder m
Critchfield' s motion for summary judgment. (R. 1682-1702.)

7

In opposition, the HOA argued that the Declaration grants the HOA broad
authority to sue the Developers and Builders. (R. 2184-2186.) Moreover, the HOA
argued that it satisfied the elements to assert an implied warranty claim. (R. 2187-2192.)
The HOA attached a self-serving declaration from its rebuttal expert to its opposition in
an attempt to cure the fatal deficiencies in its case. (R. 2183

,r

27; R. 3134-3138.)

Critchfield filed its reply memorandum on November 12, 2013. (R. 3462-3570.)
Over two months after it submitted its opposition and briefing was complete, the
HOA filed a motion for leave to supplement its opposition. (R. 3948-3950.) In its
proposed supplement, the HOA argued that it also had privity with the Developers as an
intended third-party beneficiary to the real estate purchase contracts ("REPCs") and
warranty deeds between the original homeowners and the Developers. (R. 3952-3955.)
Critchfield objected to the HOA's motion for leave because the proposed supplemental
argument was untimely, the arguments were available to the HOA at the time it filed its
original opposition, and Utah Courts have previously rejected the supplemental
arguments. (R. 3977-3983.)

E.

The District Court Grants Critchfield's Motion for Summary
Judgment and R&JL's Joinder and Dismisses the HOA's breach
of Implied Warranty Claim.

On March 4, 2014, the district court issued its Ruling and Order on Third-Party

Defendant B.A. Critchfield Construction's Motion for Summary Judgment Against
Plainttff HOA (the "March 4 Ruling"), granting Critchfield's motion for summary
judgment and R&JL's joinder, and dismissing the HOA's implied warranty claim. (R.
4092-4097.) The district court expressly held that, although the Declaration may be

8

binding between the homeowners and the HOA, nothing in the Declaration "speaks to
whether the HOA has the right to sue third parties for damages to the ~Living Units' on
behalf of the homcmivncrs." (R. 4095.) Accordingly, in the absence of explicit contractual

authority~ the district court held that the HOA lacks privity to assert an implied warranty
claim. (R. 4095.)
The district court further held that the HOA did not establish a prima facie case for
implied warranty. (R. 4095-4097.) Specifically, the district court held that the HOA failed
to meet the first element of an implied warranty claim because it neither established that
it purchased a new residence from the Developers or Builders nor that it received
assignments from the original homeowners to bring claims against the Developers or
Builders. (R. 4095-4096.) The district court held that absent proof of original ownership
of each unit allegedly affected by latent defects, the first element of the HOA's implied
warranty claim was not met. (R. 4095-4096.) Moreover, the district court held that the
HOA did not have evidence that the alleged defects create a question of safety or made
the units unfit for human habitation. (R. 4096-4097.) In reaching this conclusion, the
district court reviewed the HOA' s nearly 1,000 page long expert report and could "find
only two references to safety: the potential for water intrusion and trapping inside the
walls and on exterior surfaces, and the settling of parts of the concrete which could
potentially lead to a tripping hazard and result in an improper stair riser height." (R.
4096.) The district court concluded that these two statements were insufficient "evidence
to support its contention that the residences were unsafe or unfit for habitation" and
expert testimony was necessary "to show that the defects resulted in residences being
9

unsafe or unfit for human habitation." (R. 4096.) Finally, the district court held that the
HOA's rebuttal expert's declaration did not cure these deficiencies because his
"testimony ... is limited to rebuttal of Defendant's case-in-reply, and cannot be used to
establish elements of Plaintiffs case~in-chief." (R. 4097 citing Astill v. Clark. 956 P.2d
1081, I 086 (Utah Ct. App. 1998 ).)

F.

The HOA Files a Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 10, 2014, the HOA filed a motion to reconsider the March 4 Ruling. (R.
4185-4187.) In support, the HOA made the following arguments: (1) the district court
failed to consider the expert reports and testimony that showed the defects made the
residences unsafe or unfit for human habitation; (2) privity of contract exists between the
HOA and Developers through the Declaration; and (3) privity of contract exists between
the HOA and Developers through the original homeowners REPCs and warranty deeds
with Developers. (R. 4221-4232.) On May 23, 2014, R&JL filed its opposition to the
HOA's motion to reconsider. (R. 5601-5609.)
On June 24, 2014, the district court entered a Minute Entry and Order (the "June
24 Order") denying the HOA's motion to reconsider as follows (R. 5782-5785):

•

The HOA' s motion for reconsideration "is largely comprised of a recitation
of the identical facts, exhibits and legal analysis which the Court considered
in its March 4th Ruling." (R. 5784.)

•

The fact that the HOA disagrees with the district court's legal conclusions
and analysis "is an insufficient basis for the Court to reconsider its Ruling."
(R. 5784.)
10

The HOA "sought to supplement its Opposition [to Critchfield's motion for
summary judgment], well after briefing in this matter was complete and
afler ... the Molion was sel for hearing." (R. 5784.)
To allow additional briefing, and allow the HOA to raise new arguments
related to privity from REPCs and warranty deeds, "would have delayed
I

resolution of the majority of the dispositive motions" and "it would be
inequitable to allow [the HOA] a 'second bite at the apple' to defeat
summary judgment based solely on its failure to include a legal argument in
support of its Opposition where the underlying facts and law were known at
the time of filing the initial Opposition." (R. 5784.)
e

And even if the district court did consider HOA' s supplemental arguments,
it "would not change the Court's Ruling" because the HOA is not an
intended third-party beneficiary under the REPCs or warranty deeds. (R.
5784-5785.)

G.

The HOA Takes Its Remaining Claim against Developers and
Builders to Trial and Loses on a Directed Verdict.

After the March 4 Ruling and a subsequent clarifying ruling entered on March 26,
2014 ("March 26 Ruling"), R&JL was dismissed from the case. (R. 4169-4171.) But the
HOA still had a pending claim against Developers and Builders for breach of fiduciary
duties, so they proceeded to trial. Between October 13, 2015 and October 20, 2015, the
district court held a trial and the HOA presented its case to a jury. (R. 10104-10105.)
After the HOA rested its case, Developers and Builders moved for a directed verdict. (R.

11
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10105.) On October 20, 2015, the district court issued a ruling and order granting the
motion for directed verdict. (R. 9467, 10105.) The district court entered its Final
Judgment on January 22, 2016. (R. 10104-10105.)
The HOA filed its notice of appeal on February 11, 2016. (R. 10111-10113.)
Developers and Builders filed their notice of cross-appeal on February 24, 2016. (R.
10125-10127.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
As the district court properly held, the HOA (1) lacks privity of contract with
Developers and Builders; and (2) cannot satisfy the elements of an implied warranty
claim. In its opening brief, the HOA argues that it has privity of contract through the
Declaration and as an intended third-party beneficiary of the REPCs and warranty deeds
executed by and between the original homeowners and the Developers. (HOA Br. at 2834.) The HOA also argues that its expert report is sufficient to show safety and
habitability concerns. (HOA Br. at 22-28.) The HOA's arguments fail for at least 5
reasons.
First, as the district court correctly held, the Declaration does not grant the HOA
any rights to sue on its own behalf or on behalf of the homeowners. The Declaration is a
contract between the HOA and the landowners, and that contractual relationship does not
extend to the Developers and Builders.
Second, the HOA failed to preserve its third-party beneficiary arguments. In its
opposition to Critchfield's motion for summary judgment, the HOA did not raise any
third-party beneficiary arguments related to the REPCs or warranty deeds. (R. 2176-

12

2193.) Over two months after the HOA filed its opposition, the HOA filed a motion for
leave to file a supplemental opposition to include third-party beneficiary arguments. (R.
3948-3970.) The district court exercised its discretion and denied the HOA's motion for
leave to file a supplemental opposition. (R. 5784.) As a result, these arguments were not
preserved for appeal.
Third, even if the HOA had preserved its third-party beneficiary arguments, they
still fail as a matter of law. The HOA does not qualify as a third-party beneficiary under

either the REPCs or the warranty deeds because the homeowners and Developers did not
intend to bestow a beneficial interest to the HOA under the REPCs or warranty deeds.
Fourth, the HOA cannot establish a prima facie case for an implied warranty
claim. In fact, the HOA fails to appeal or challenge the district court's dismissal of the
implied warranty claim based on the district court's holding that "the HOA has not
demonstrated that the units containing the alleged latent defects are owned by the original
homeowners, such that the implied warranty attaches," as required under Davencourt. (R.
4095; see generally HOA Br.) The HOA's silence is an implicit admission that it cannot
satisfy this element. Thus, on this basis alone, the Court should deny the HOA' s appeal.
Fifth, the HOA cannot maintain a claim for implied warranty because, as the
district court properly held, the HOA's expert report does not establish that the alleged
defects create a question of safety or made any of the houses unfit for human habitation.
The district court's March 4 Ruling and March 26 Ruling should be affirmed and
the HOA' s implied warranty claim should be dismissed.

13

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE HOA
LACKS CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY TO SUE THE DEVELOPERS
OR BUILDERS.

The district court correctly held that the HOA lacks standing to sue the Developers
and Builders under an implied warranty claim. Based on the undisputed facts, and even
with all reasonable inferences favoring the HOA, the HOA's implied warranty claim fails
as a matter of law.
In Davencourt, this Court first recognized an implied warranty of habitability and
an implied warranty of good quality and workmanship in Utah, which ~-arises under
contract 1mv. ,. 2009 UT 65 at i,~ 56-60. In Utah, "[p ]rivity of contract is required to bring
a claim for breach of the implied warranty." ld. at

1 57;

see also id. at

,r

63 ("[T]he

Association may bring its claim for breach of the implied warranty, but it must show
privity of contract with the Developer.").

A.

The HOA Does Not Have Privity under the Declaration.

As the district court held, the HOA lacks privity under the Declaration to bring a
claim for implied warranty against the Developers or Builders. (R. 4095.) In Utah, the
original homeowner of a new residence--not a homeowners association-has the right to
bring a claim for implied warranty under its purchase contract. Davencourt, 2008 UT 65
at

~

55 ("[I]n every contract for the sale of a new residence, a vendor in the business of

building or selling such residences makes an implied warranty to the vendee that the
residence is constructed in a workmanlike manner and fit for habitation."). The
requirement for privity in an implied warranty claim comports with Ptah Code Ann.
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~

H---~ -::=: · \ which states that "[a]n action for defective design or construction may be
brought only by a person in privity of contract"

f);!vcncuuri .

i< U -:l---5

l

.-2nn:-< l T

1\.:;

1 :

:1

quoting

further states, 'Nothing in this

section precludes a person from assigning a right under a contract to another person,
including to a subsequent owner or a homeowners association."'
(;~ i.li.

n.lJ quoting L:uh Code 1-\nn. :~

7 8B-4-5U(6}.

D:.l'.

e::·-.:!'. LLrt, ,20\):?
1

l.

T

Thus, under Utah law, an original

homeowner can bring an implied warranty claim if certain elements are satisfied. And; as
Davencourt explains, an original homeowner can assign that right to a subsequent
homeowner or to a homeowners association. Id.
Here, the HOA does not argue that the original homeowners assigned the right to
bring an implied warranty claim to the HOA. Instead, the HOA argues that it has an
independent right through the Declaration to sue the Developers. (HOA Br. at 29-30.)
Specifically, the HOA argues that the Declaration grants the HOA "the right (and
obligation) to maintain certain common property and accept all owners as members, and
in exchange, the property owner commits future owners to pay assessments to the
Association and to abide by certain standards," and that this gives the HOA contractual
privity with the Developers to bring an implied warranty claim. (HOA Br. at 30 citing R.
2194-2222.)
Noticeably absent from the HOA's argument is any legal authority to support its
position that the Declaration is a contract between the HOA and the Developers. It is not.

. . court proper1y h__e_ld., Le
h D
. 1s
. " a b.md..mg con_rac
t t__hetween Le
h
__ ec Iaratlon
As t.he d1stnct
homeowners and the HOA." (R. 4095.) The HOA only cited a single provision of the
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Declaration to support its argument: "The Association shall provide exterior maintenance
of the Living Units including but not limited to painting, repair, replacement and care of
roofs, gutters, downspouts, and exterior building surfaces." (R. 4095.) Based upon a plain
reading, the district court held nothing in the Declaration "provides the HOA with
authorization from the homeowners to pursue claims for breach of implied warranty on
their behalf." (R. 4095.) And even if the Declaration was an agreement between the HOA
and Developers, nothing in the Declaration gives the HOA "independent authority to
bring [implied warranty] claims on its own behalf." (R. 4095.)
As this Court has previously held, the implied warranty is inherent "in every
contract for the sale of a new residence .... " 2008 UT 65 at

,r

55. Nowhere in the

Davencourt decision did this Court state that declarations, covenants, or restrictions that
are recorded against real property grant a homeowner's association the right to bring an
implied warranty claim. Despite this, the HOA argues that "the existence of privity
between declarants and associations is well-grounded in established Utah law." (HOA Br.
at 28 citing Forest Meadow Ranch Propertv Owners Ass·n. L.L.C. v. Pine Meadow
Ranch Home Ass'n, 2005 UT App 294. 118 P.3d 871.) The HOA's reliance on Forest
Meado\v is misplaced.
Forest Meadow is inapplicable to this case because it addresses privity of estate
not privity of contract. The HOA is attempting to conflate the legal concepts of
establishing privity of estate necessary to demonstrate that a restrictive covenant runs
with the land and privity of contract necessary to bring an implied warranty claim under
Davencourt. Tellingly, the elements for a claim that a covenant runs with the land are
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entirely different than those for a claim for breach of the implied warranty. Compare
Privity
of contract is defined as: "The relationship behveen the parties to a contract, allowing
them to sue each other but preventing a third party from doing so." Black's Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). In other words, privity applies only to the actual contracting
parties. As the HOA concedes, 3 Davencourt specifically limited claims for breach of the
implied warra.nty to parties in direct privity of contract in order to avoid creating
unintended third-party causes of action for non-contractual parties. D8vencnurt, 2009 {_;T
(}5

at

il 2 3. That is exactly what the HOA-which unquestionably was not a party to the

contracts between the Developers and original homeowners-is seeking to do here.
However, this is not the law in Utah. Rather, as set forth in 0~1 vcncourt, to establish a
claim for breach of the implied warranty contractual privity must exist between the
purchaser and the seller. Here, that privity exists only between the Developers and the
original homeowners via their individual real estate purchase contracts and the HOA is a
stranger to those contracts. Accordingly, Forest Meadow does not and could not support
the HOA's position on appeal.
Further, Forest Meadow has no precedential value and should not be relied on by
the Court. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Forest M (:ridrni..- decision, but only after the
Court struck the petitioners' briefs for including "attacks on the integrity of the court of
appeals panel that decided the cases below." Peters v. Pinc Meadow· Ranch Home Ass·n.
2tJ07 Lil
3

L if 2J,

15 t P.3<l ~)C,2. After striking the briefs, the Court ""declin[ed] to consider

(HOA Br. at 30.)
17

the issues as to which [it] granted certiorari" and "limit[ed] the court of appeals'
decisions to the facts of each case, and deem[ ed] the decisions to be without precedential
effect." Id. (emphasis added). Without a decision on the merits or precedential effect, the
Forest Meadow provides little value and is inapplicable to this case.
Moreover, even if the HOA could establish privity of contract with Developers,
the HOA has admitted that it does not have privity of contract with Builders. (R. 2179 at

,r 9; R. 2181

at ,r 15.) R&JL only has contract with Builders, not Developers. (R. 1682-

1702.) Thus, any claim asserted by the HOA against the Developers could not pass
through to R&JL. Accordingly, regardless of the finding regarding privity between the
HOA and the Developers, this Court should make clear that it does not affect the
dismissal of R&JL from this case.
B.

The HOA Failed to Preserve Its Privity Argument Related to the
REPCs or Warranty Deeds.

In its original opposition, the HOA did not argue (as it tries to do here) that it has
,._.J

"contractual privity with the Developers because it is a third-party beneficiary to the
REPCs and warranty deeds between the Developers and the individual Unit Owners."
(HOA Br. at 30.) "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to
the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc .. 2004 UT 72. 4i 5 L 99 P.3<l 80 l (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted).
Here, the HOA did not attempt to raise this argument until filing a motion for
leave to supplement its opposition over two months after filing its original opposition. (R.
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3948-3955.) Critchfield objected to the HOA 's motion for leave and the district court
eventually denied the HOA's motion for leave because it would have "delayed resolution
of the majority of dispositive motions'· and "it would be inequitable to allow [the HOA] a
·second bite at the apple' to defeat summary judgment based solely on its failure to
include a legal argument in support of its Opposition where the underlying facts and law
were known at the time of filing the initial Opposition." (R. 3977-3983, 5784.)
Because the trial court denied the HOA's motion for leave, the HOA's third party
beneficiary arguments regarding the REPCs and warranty deeds were not part of the trial
court's summary judgment decision. Thus, the HOA neither presented its REPC and
warranty deed arguments in a way that the trial court had an opportunity to rule on them
nor allowed other parties to oppose these arguments before the district court.
Accordingly, the HOA failed to preserve these arguments for appeal and this Court
should not consider them here.
Moreover, although it is not raised in the HOA's statement of the issues or its
brief, to the extent the HOA is seeking to challenge the district court's ruling denying the
HOA' s motion for leave to supplement, that decision is within the broad discretion of the
trial court, and this Court "will not disturb such a ruling absent a showing of an abuse of
that discretion." Sm;tL \:. (irnnd C:rn1,c:-ri Exncditions Co.: 2003 !_,'T 57) ~[ 31. ½4 P.Jd
l ! 54. And since the HOA has not even raised the issue on appeal, much less alleged that

the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for leave to supplement, the
district comt's denial should be upheld and the HO.A's argument deemed 1u1preserved.
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C.

The HOA's REPC and Warranty Deed Privity Arguments Fail
on Their Merits.

Even if the HOA had properly preserved its third-party beneficiary privity
arguments, these arguments still fail as a matter of law. "Whether a third-party
beneficiary status exists is determined by examining a written contract." Am. Tov,;ers
Ovmers Ass~n. Inc. v. CCI Mechanical. Inc. 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1996). "To
1

establish enforceable rights ... the Association had to establish that it was an intended
beneficiary of one or more contracts." Id. "The intent of the contracting parties to confer
a separate and distinct benefit must be clear." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "A
third party who benefits only incidentally from the performance of a contract has no right
to recover under that contract." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the HOA argues that "[e]ach original owner within the Gables ... has direct
privity with the Developer through a REPC." (HOA Br. at 31.) R&JL does not dispute
this. But the HOA also argues that it is a third-party beneficiary to the REPCs because
"each purchase contract not only transfers individual rights to the Units, but the contract
also binds each purchaser to the requirements and restrictions found in the Association's
Declaration." (HOA Br. at 31.) The HOA then argues that the "warranty deeds issued·by
the developer . . . also conveyed an easement to use and enjoy the common areas and
facilities," and therefore, the deeds "underscore the benefit created in the Association as a
result of the sale of the property." (HOA Br. at 32.)
Nothing in the REPCs or the warranty deeds, however, demonstrates that the
homeowners and Developers intended to confer a separate and distinct benefit on the
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HOA. The HOA cites no case law to support its argument that it has privity of contract
under the REPCs or warranty deeds to sue the Developers under an implied warranty
claim. Thus, as the distiict court prnpeily held on the IIOA' s motion for reconsideration,
''the fact that Plaintiff may incidentally benefit from the contracts is insufficient, as a
matter of law, to confer third-party beneficiary status." (R. 5784.)

n.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE HOA
DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR AN IMPLIED
WARRANTY CLAIM.

Even if the HOA had privity to bring its implied warranty claim-which it does
not-the HOA's claim still fails as a matter of law. Under Utah law, to establish a breach
of the implied warranty claim the plaintiff must show "(1) the purchase of a new
residence from a defendant ... (2) the residence contained a latent defect; (3) the defect
manifested itself after purchase; (4) the defect was caused by improper design, material,
or workmanship; and (5) the defect created a question of safety or made the house unfit
for human habitation." DavencourL 2009 LT 65 at

A.

"l 60.

The District Court Correctly Held that the HOA has not
Satisfied the First Element for an Implied Warranty Claim.

In its March 4 Ruling, the district court held that "the HOA has not demonstrated
that the units containing the alleged latent defects are owned by the original homeowners,
such that the implied warranty attaches." (R. 4095.) The district court therefore held that
the HOA had failed to meet the first element of its breach of implied warranty claim.
The HOA fails to challenge this holding in its opening brief. (See generally HOA
Br.) As a result, the HOA has not appealed this issue and the Court is unable to review
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this issue on appeal. See Berkshires. L.L.C. v. Svk~s, 2(HJ5 LT App 536, ~: 20. 127 P.3d
1 l 22 ("We decline to review the issue of plain error when raised for the first time in an
appellant's reply brief."). Thus, as a matter of law, the HOA cannot establish a prima
facie case for an implied warranty claim and the Court should affirm the district court's
dismissal.
Further, having failed to raise the argument on appeal, the HOA has now waived
its right to do so. "Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right." Meadow
Vallev Contr.. Inc. v. State Dep't ofTransp., 20t 1 UT 35,

~ 45,266

P.3d 671 (quotation

and citation omitted). A waiver requires three elements: "(l) an existing right, benefit, or
advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish that right."
Soter·s, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass·n. 857 P.2d 935. 940 (Utah 1993).
Here, the HOA intentionally relinquished its right to appeal this holding from the
district court. There is no dispute that the HOA had the right to appeal this portion of the
district court's March 4 Ruling and that the HOA had knowledge of this right. Based on a
plain reading of its opening brief, the HOA intentionally relinquished this right by failing
to raise any challenge or argument to refute the district court's holding. Accordingly, the
'..:P

HOA has waived its right to appeal this finding from the district court and the Supreme
Court can affirm the district court's March 4 Ruling and dismissal on this basis alone.

B.

The District Court Correctly Held that the HOA has not
Satisfied the Fifth Element of an Implied Warranty Claim.

Finally, the district court properly held that the HOA "has not met its burden of
proof on the fifth element, since it has not demonstrated that the latent defects created a
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question of safety or made the house unfit for human habitation." (R. 4096.) In order to
establish an implied warranty claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged defects
create a question of safety or make the house unfit for human habitation. Ua\ cr,cnuri.
2no9 Ur :'55 :.r'.

:i;

60. "Utah courts have held that expert testimony may be helpful, and in

some cases necessary, in establishing the standard of care required in cases dealing with
the duties owed by a particular profession." Prcstc1 11 & Clian1b1..Ts. P.C.

\i.

Koller, 943

1 [ (). "Expert testimony is required where the average person has little understanding of
the duties owed by particular trades or professions, as in cases involving medical doctors,
architects, and engineers." Koller. 94] P.::2d at 26.; (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Here, as properly explained by the district court, expert testimony is necessary to
determine whether the alleged defects create safety issues in the house or make the house
uninhabitable. (R. 4096.) The HOA's expert report contains no findings or conclusions
sufficient to establish defects affecting safety or habitability of the units. In reviewing the
HOA's expert report, which is nearly 1,000 pages long, the district court found "only two
references to safety: the potential for water intrusion and trapping inside the walls and on
exterior surfaces, and the settling of parts of the concrete which could potentially lead to
a tripping hazard and result in an improper stair riser height." (R. 4096.) The district court
properly held that these two lone statements were insufficient "evidence to support its
contention that the residences were unsafe or unfit for habitation" and expert testimony
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was necessary "to show that the defects resulted in residences being unsafe or unfit for
human habitation." (R. 4096.)
Recognizing this failure, the HOA instead tries to argue that the expert report
details "defects and damages caused by significant water intrusion which requires
substantial repair." (HOA Br. at 27.) The HOA also asserts (without citation) that later
trial testimony demonstrates the sufficiency of the defect evidence, but that evidence was
not presented by the HOA on summary judgment and cannot bear on the issues on appeal
of the district court's summary judgment decision. (HOA Br. at 23.) The HOA further
argues that in other jurisdictions the implied warranty is broadly construed and water
intrusion is sufficient to establish an implied warranty claim. (HOA Br. at 24-27.) That
may be generally true in certain jurisdictions. However, nothing in the HOA's brief or
the cases cited therein changes the analysis here. Namely, that in Utah the HOA has an
obligation to provide expert evidence that the defects at issue are a safety concern or
could make the house unfit for human habitation. Davencourt, 2009 UT 65 at

,r 60.

The

district court properly held that HOA' s failure to do so results in the dismissal of its
implied warranty claim. This Court should affirm that decision.
CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth herein, R&JL respectfully requests that the Court
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment and dismiss the HOA's breach of
the implied warranty claim.
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